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( RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS.*
Contested Election-Corrupt Practices Act-Notice of Contest
-Expense Account-Supersedeas Bond.-In a contest for the
nominations for six offices the trial court sustained demurrers to
the jurisdiction. In passing upon the cases together two points
are discussed, which the court says "are of public interest and
should be adjudicated so that the proper procedure concerning the
points involved may be settled."
Section 1550, subsection 26, of Kentucky Statutes, provides that
on the third day after the primary election the county election
commissioners shall canvass the returns and immediately issue cer-
tificates of nomination to the winners. Subsection 28 of the same
section provides that any candidate wishing to contest a nomi-
nation shall file his notice "within five days from the time the
election commissioners shall have awarded the certificate of nom-
ination to such candidate whose nomination is contested."
Section 6 of the Corrupt Practices Act calls for a statement of
expenses to be filed by every candidate within thirty days after
the election, and the next section forbids any officer to issue the
certificate of nomination until such statement has been filed.
The court holds that the suit should have been filed within five
days from the time the returns were canvassed. Judge Carroll
says:
"The certificate for purposes of contest should be treated as
awarded when it has been ascertained by a canvass and tabulation
of the votes who the successful candidate is, although the certifi-
cate may not then be issued. . . . we think the actual issual of
the certificate is not a prerequisite to the commencement of an
election contest. . . . The intent of this statute is that the
contest shall be commenced within five days from the time the
commissioners should have awarded the certificate."
On the day judgment was rendered in the lower court the
appellants offered to execute supersedeas bonds, which procedure
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is prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court. The
clerk of the circuit court refused to permit the execution of said
bonds. The court says:
"When it is made to satisfactorily appear that the con-
testant was prevented from executing the bond on the day thejudgment was rendered by unavoidable casualty or misfortune or
accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against, or by circumstances beyond his control, he may
execute the bond" on the day following and it will have the same
effect as if executed on the day the judgment was rendered."
Since the bonds were not executed at all, the appeals were dis-
missed. Ward, etc. v. Howard, etc., 177 Ky. 38.
Elements of False Swearing Under Statute.-The defendant,
while in jail convicted of maintaining a nuisance, made affidavit
that if the court would grant him a new trial he would remove
from the judicial district wherein he was held. Having failed to
comply with the terms of his affidavit, defendant was' indicted
for false swearing under section 1174 of the Kentucky Statutes; a
demurrer was sustained to said indictment. The court affirmed
the decision, because the matter sworn to was, (1) neither judi-
cially pending; nor (2) was being investigated by. a grand jury;
nor (3) was a subject in which the defendant could have been le-
gally sworn; nor (4) on which he was required to be sworn.
Commonwealth v. Hinkle, 177 Ky. 22.
Divorce a MIensa et Thoro.-A husband and wife from the time
of their marriage in New York never lived together. The wife
"domiciled" in New York, procured an ex parte divorce from bed
and board, on grounds of cruelty. When her husband, domiciled
throughout in Connecticut, began suit there for a divorce a vinculo
for desertion,. she introduced, the New York decree to justify her
living apart. Held, that such a decree, as opposed to full divorce,
did not affect the marriage status, was personal in its nature, and
was not in any way effective in another state unless entered by a
court having jurisdiction over the defendant.
Pettis v. Pettis (1917), 91 Conn. 608, 101 Atl. 13.
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A Charge of Disloyalty or Sedition Libelous per se.--A publi-
cation imputing disloyalty, it is held in the Michigan case of Van
Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co., 161 N. W. 979, L. R. A. 1917D 855,
may be actionable per se, although it does not amount to a charge of
a criminal offense. Hence it is libelous per se to publish of one
that he is a "man who reviled U. S. flag," "Who denounced Old
Glory as a dirty rag," a "red-tinted agitator," voicing "construc-
tive sedition and treason," keeping "beyond the last border of un-
loyalty and indecency" by "denouncing Old Glory as a dirty rag,"
and "wantonly insulted the symbol of a patriotic allegiance."
Wells v. Times Printing Co. (1913), 77 Wash. 171, 137 Pac. 457.
Such language, the court said, required no innuendo to construe its
meaning as intending to bring the individual of whom it was writ-
ten into public hatred, contempt, and ridicule, expose him to public
hatred, scorn, and shame, and cause him to be shunned and avoided
by his fellows.
So also to publish of one that he is a "dangerous, able, and
seditious agitator" is libelous per se. Wilkes v. Shields (1895),
62 Minn. 426, 64 N. W. 921. The court stated that a seditious
agitator can be neither a good citizen nor a fit associate for honor-
able men. The obvious meaning of the words, "a seditious agitat-
or," as they would naturally be understood by ordinary men when
published in reference to another, is that he is a disturber of the
public peace and order, a subverter of just laws, and a bad citizen;
and so the publication of such a charge is clearly libelous and ac-
tionable per se.
But to charge one with taking part in a revolt or revolution
within a foreign government is held not libelous per se, in Crashley
v. Press Pub. Co. (1904), 179 N. Y. 27, 71 N. E. 258, 7 Ann. Cas.
196, in the absence of an allegation of the existence of some statute
making such an act a treasonable offense and prescribing pains or
penalties for the commission of the crime.
From editorial in Case and Comment.
What is a Threat?-The accused said: "President Wilson
ought to be killed. It is a wonder some one has not done it al-
ready. If I had an opportunity, I would do it myself." He was
indicted under the Federal statute making a wilful threat against(
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the life of the President of the United States punishable* by heavy
fine or imprisonment, or both. On demurrer to the indictment, de-
fendant denied that his language was sufficient to constitute a
threat. The demurrer was properly overruled.
U. S. v. Stickroth, 242 Fed. 151.
Contract for Payment of Public Funds to Sectarian School Un-
constitutional.-An arrangement, between the board of education
of a county and a sectarian college, under which the college, out of
the common school funds, is paid tuition fees for county high
school pupils, is a flagrant violation of section 189, Constitution of
Kentucky, which forbids that any portion of any fund or tax now
existing, or that may hereafter be raised or levied for educational
purposes, shall be appropriated to or used by or in aid of any
church, sectarian or denominational school.
-Williams, et al., v. Trustees Stanton Com. School Dist., 173
Ky. 708, 191 S. W. 507.
False General Statements Immaterial.-Section 14b (3) of the
Bankruptcy Act, as amended in 1910, providing that a discharge
shall be refused if the bankrupt has "obtained money or property
upon a materially false statement in writing made by him to any
person or his representative for the purpose of obtaining credit
from *such person," cannot be construed to cover general state-
ments to mercantile agencies, not specifically asked for by pros-
pective creditors.
Ould & Company v. Davis, 40 Am. B. R. 185.
What Creditor Can File Petition?-Within the meaning of sec-
tion 59b of the Bankruptcy Act permitting one creditor to file a
petition where all the creditors are less than twelvie in number, the
term "creditor" does not include those who have small current
monthly accounts against the alleged bankrupt for groceries, fuel
and the like, furnished to him. The bankruptcy law is never in-
voked by any such small creditors, who themselves have adequate
remedy for the collection of their accounts by cutting off further
supplies.
Matter of Burg, 40 Am. B. R. 126.
Recent Important Decisions.
Contingent Fees in Breach of Promise Suits.-In the recent Mis-
souri case of Crow v. Mitchell, 192 S. W. 417, L. R. A. 1917D, 912,
it is held-probably the first time the question has been decided
in a court of last resort-that under contract for a contingent fee
of one-half of the moneys secured for the client in any way by the
attorney in a suit for breach of promise, the attorney could not have
one-half of the property acquired by the client by operation of law
when she married the adverse party, nor could he recover any part
of the value of such marriage.
Prescriptive Rights.-The grant of a right of passway by pre-
scription will be presumed from an uninterrupted, unexplained and
adverse use of such a nature as to indicate a claim of right for
fifteen years or more. There is a marked difference between the
right of the public claiming a passway when the travel has been
for many years through open, uncultivated woodland and where it
has been through enclosed, cultivated land; and it requires much
stronger evidence to establish a right by prescription to a pass-
way through open, uncultivated woods than it does to establish
such right through enclosed, cultivated land.
Davidson v. Nantz, 177 Ky. 50.
Contract of Employment Determined by Enlistment in Army.-
That a contract of employment is subject to the implied term that
it shall cease to be binding if future performance becomes unlaw-
ful, and therefore that it becomes finally determined, and not merely
suspended, where the employee is drafted into or enlisted in the
army, is held in Marshall v. Clanvill (1917), 2 K. B. 87, 116 L. T.
N. S. 560.
Licenses-Occupation Tax-Police Regulation-Void Transac-
tion.-Section 4224, Kentucky Statutes, imposes a license tax on
firms and persons, exclusive of banks and trust companies, engaged
in buying and selling stocks, bonds and other securities. Plaintiff
entered into an agreement by which it was to sell a large amount
of stock, and, although but one sale was made, the court held that
plaintiff comes within the purview of the above mentioned statute.
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Failure to procure license as provided by section 4224, Ken-
tucky Statutes, is a misdemeanor. Transactions without such li-
cense are illegal. This law is a police regulation, and not purely a
revenue measure. Contracts entered into by those carrying on
business without license are void and unenforcible.
National Industrial Fire Insurance Co. v. Great Southern Fire
Insurance Co., 177 Ky. 56.
Right of Competition Regulated by Commission.-That the opera-
tion of an autobus for hire parallel to an electric railway between
municipalities will not be allowed merely because of inadequate
railfvay service is held in the Pennsylvania case of Southern Penn.
Traction Co. v. Hartel, P. U. R. 1917C, 627, since, if complaint is
made against the service, the commission can order it remedied.
Due Process Clause.-The Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co., having cut
down its local passenger service as a war economy measure, was,
after a hearing by the State Railroad Commission, ordered to
operate additional trains. It appeared that the traffic would not
pay a reasonable profit over the cost of operation. The court held
that such regulation was a violation of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Miss. R. R. Com. v. Mobile & Ohio R. R., 37 Sup. Ct. 602.
Widow Is Not Heir of Deceased Husband.-The widow is not an
heir of her deceased husband within the meaning of the statute
which authorizes the personal representative or heir at law to erect
a monument over the grave of her deceased husband at the cost
of his estate. The heir is the person on whom the law casts the
estate in lands, tenements and hereditaments immediately on the
death of the ancestor.
Higginbotham, Admr., v. Higginbotham, 177 Ky. 271.
